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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

*
*

Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

*
*

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN, JR
Defendant / Appellant

Appellate Case No. 20080243-CA
*

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the District Court's wrongfully accepting the
defendant's plea, the denial of the defendant's withdrawal of his plea, the failure
of the court to allow the defendant time to make restitution and the length of his
sentence.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE
DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN
ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED. Standard of Review: Abuse
of discretion. See State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932 (Utah 1994)
ISSUE II. DID THE STATE FAIL TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR
ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. Standard of Review for the trial
court's ruling regarding substantial compliance with constitutional and
procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. See Willet v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah
1992); State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Utah 1991).

ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT. Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to prison.. UA sentence
will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion, failed
to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits."
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 4546 (Utah Ct App. 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

U.C.A. THEFT BY DECEPTION 76-6-405
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only
falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in
communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.
Rule 11 Pleas
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open
court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in
the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to
appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
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(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall
forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be
given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to
compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the
plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence
to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged
the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a
plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for
extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally
ill to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in
writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant
to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure
to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for
withdrawal of the plea.
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser
included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall
be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court.
4

(i)( i) i ne judge shall i lot participate in plea discussion .
plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(\)(2) When a tentative plea agreenieir has been reached, the jiakv pon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of ihe tentative
agreement and the reasons tbi i : •= advance ofthe time for tender o!
the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition w ill be approved.
(i)(J) ii in*, judge then decides that imai uispositioii silould not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call :r the defendant to either nHn- ^ -> rKimu the p!o->
VJ)

V\ ith approxal ofthe court and the consent ofthe prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilt} ..UKI mentally
ill. or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of ihe adverse determination of any specified
pre-trial moiion \ defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea..
(iv) w lien a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and ineniuii) in n
addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record
as a whole. An\ \ariance from the procedures required, by this n tie whicl l
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to
comply with this rule is not. by itself, sufficient grounds for a
collateral attnek *>n i - -<'\4\ plea.
(Amended effective May 1, 1 vv.>. juhuau ,. , -; .o. .VM embei ». •
November 1. 2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005: November
2005, Amended January 14, 2008, Effective January 1, 2008.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
The appellant was charged by way of information with eleven counts of
Theft by Deception. R. 001. He entered an Alford type guilty plea on May 14,
2007. R. 031. The State set forth the factual basis to support the charges. R. 104.
The plea was a conditional plea in which the defendant would be able to withdraw
his guilty plea upon the payment of restitution and the charges would be
dismissed. R. 031.
The defendant was serving a sentence at the Utah State Prison when he
entered his plea and was unable to be released from the Department of
Correction's custody in order for him to access the funds in which to make
restitution. Prior to the defendants sentencing counsel made a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. The court denied the motion R. 107. The trial court denied the
motions. R. 107. The defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2008. R. 086. The
court sentenced the defendant to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison on all
eleven counts. He ordered that counts 1 through 3 to run consecutive to counts 4
through 7 and counts 8 through 11 will run consecutively to those charges. R. 086,

B. Statement of Facts
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I (ah. a Mr. Richard \\ ater^ transferred money to the defendant totaling
, s .iin (\(\(\ n,

tii > p ; : r-

p *n6 p 3 r\liese monies were transferred lor a

Dunn acknowledged that he received these amounts, k . iu4 i-. o.
That subsequently, some several months latei. " '•-;. Waters made several
i

• * : AL. and ;,u viclenc.ant was

not able lo return the mono} because ol m^ incao cm;
The State proffered certain facts thai if ihe ease were to proceed lo .i.ah
t

. • i. • * were used inconsistent to the purpose that

the\ were given to M i . Uuini. there!
over the funds, R. 104 P S The i\\o\\'\
h

^

-'

>1

was given lo Mi'. Dunn ;.;. v.

. • . r.ul some olnei ;niii;^. i

. -

elements of the ease, the ^i.r

support of the
" *•••

records, to show that the monies were used inconsistent lor the purpose
it was gi\ v

!

Mr. Dunn did not agree w " ' ' . • ' . the guih> plea.

!

*•'

Me plead guilty on a,tlf : ord

type basis iii an

aucmpi io L:CI w,; *., ,.,,, , ,,c delendant w a s on probation in Salt L a k e
C o 11111 \ \ \ hen ill i" 11i," 111 J 11 it I I n i 1111. • in 11111 \ • 1IN mad i" I { I (11 !" '" I"! e I * \1 e
he could access the funds, his probation w as revoked and w a s
incarcerated in the I Itah State Prison. R 104 P. 9.
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4.

Mr. Dunn plead guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception, all
second degree felonies. He plead guilty on the basis the Court would
release him on his own recognizance pending sentencing and the State
of Utah would write a letter to the Board of Pardons asking for his
release. R. 36. The defendant agreed to deposit $1,300,000.00 into the
Trust account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the
guilty pleas and being released from the Utah State Prison. R. 36.

5.

He further agreed to turn his passport over to his attorney and not leave
the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from his
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case. R. 36.

6.

Mr. Dunn agreed to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust
account of his defense attorney, within 90 days of entering the guilty
pleas in this case and being released from the Utah State Prison. The
money was to be paid to Richard Waters to compensate him for the
monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to him during the years 2004
and 2005. The State agreed once it had reasonably verified that Mr.
Waters has received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, they would
stipulate to withdrawing his plea to the eleven counts and dismiss the
charges against him. R. 36 The written plea agreement did not set forth
the factual basis for the pleas. It made reference to the facts the
prosecutor would state in open court during the plea hearing. R. 32.
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On August 20, 2007, a status conference was held in the First District
Court. Mr. Dunn had not been released from the Utah State Prison and
the mattered was continued until November, 19th 2007. The court date
was changed to November 26, 2007. R. 50. The defendant failed to
appear for court on November 26, 2007 and a warrant for $20,000.00
dollars was issued on December 4, 2007. R. 55.
On January 14, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing and a
motion was made to continue the sentencing for another sixty (60) days.
The defendant was sure he could access the money and pay Mr. Waters
within that time. The court continued sentencing until February 11,
2008. R. 106 P. 4. The defendant is in custody of the Department of
Corrections at the Utah State Prison.
On February 25, 2008, the defendant appeared for sentencing. His
attorney made a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty pleas. R. 107
P.2. He also asks the Court for additional time for the defendant to read
his pre-sentence report. The court denies all motions and requests. R.
107 P. 4. The court sentences the defendant to serve, One to fifteen
years at the Utah State Prison on each of the counts. He was ordered to
pay a fine on each count of $1,500.00 and pay restitution in the amount
of $1,149,175.00. plus interest. The court ran counts one through three
consecutively. Counts four through seven consecutively and counts
eight through eleven consecutively.
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The defendant/appellant alleges on appeal he should have been given more
time to get the funds sought for by the State in behalf of Mr. Richard Waters.
Because of his confinement in the Utah State Prison he was never given the
opportunity to access the funds transferred to him and return them to Mr. Waters.
He further alleges that the State failed to set forth a proper factual basis to
support the alford pleas that he entered and that the court did not strictly comply
with Rule 11. The plea affidavit did not contain the elements of the crime and the
court did not explain them to the defendant.
He further alleges that his guilty pleas that the court should have allowed
his guilty plea be withdraw.
Finally, the defendant asserts that the courts imposition of consecutive
sentences was cruel and unusual punishment.
ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I. DID THE COURT ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING THE
DEFENDANT A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE RESITUTION IN
ORDER FOR THE CASE TO BE DISMISSED
Mr. Dunn, the appellant entered into an unusual plea agreement with
the State of Utah. He entered Alford pleas to the Eleven counts of Theft by
Deception against him. The only consideration he received in return was the
State agreed to allow him to withdraw his plea upon the payment of full
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restitution. The State did not dismiss any of the Counts or reduce their
severity.

The defendant in essence entered in a contract with the State if Utah and
the Court to repay the restitution owing to Mr. Waters. The defendant was unable
to perform on the contract. Mr. Waters continued incarceration at the Utah State
Prison prohibited him from obtaining access to the funds to re-pay them to Mr.
Waters, thus it was impossible for him to perform on the contract.
In State v. Stringham, 17 P.3d 1153 (Utah) suggests that an agreement
just between the State and the defendant is just an executory agreement until the
Court signs off on the agreement. Once the Court has accepted a defendant's
guilty plea the agreement is analogous to a contract and legally binding agreement
has been reached. Mr. Dunn could not perform on the contract because of his
continued incarceration and the prohibitions place on him in his very short stay in
a half-way house setting.
The essential elements of contract formation were
present here. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1985) (indicating that the essential elements of a contract include
"offer and acceptance, competent parties,_and consideration") The offer
from the State was that if the defendant will plead guilty to all eleven
Second Degree Felonies and make restitution the State will allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea and dismiss the charges. This defendant was
11

not able to make the restitution because he could not access the funds while
incarcerated at Utah State Prison and released shortly to a half-way house.
Thus, it was impossible for him to perform on the contract. Once the Court
realized the contemplated plea-bargain was impossible for him to perform,
he should have allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea and allow him to
exercise his right to a trial. The defendant attempted, prior to sentencing to
withdraw his plea but the court denied his request. See Addendum D.
Wherefore, the appellant requests the court to allow him withdraw
his plea or extend the timeframe so he can transfer the money back to Mr.
Waters.

ISSUE II. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. THE COURT SHOULD NEVER
ACCEPTED THE PLEA. THE COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY
WITH RULE 11.
The Trial Court erred when they accepted the defendant's plea to
theft by deception. In setting forth a factual basis for the plea the State
failure to proffer evidence of all the elements of the crime.

(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
(2) Theft by Deception does not occur, however, when there is only
falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by
12

statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in
communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.
In State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 262 the court held to commit
theft by deception, a party must exercise control over another's property by
means of a deception. The trial judge did not bind the defendant over on the
charge because the State failed to show any deception on the part of the
defendant. The Utah Court of appeals affirmed his decision.
In the current case Mr. Waters gave the defendant some money. See
Addendum C. Mr. Dunn did not deceive Mr. Waters into giving him the
money. When Mr. Waters asked for the money back, Mr. Dunn was not
able to return the money because he was incarcerated. The essential element
of deception on the part of the defendant is absent based upon the facts
tendered by the State.
Mr. Dunn entered an Alford plea to the charges because he did not
agree to the facts set forth by the State. He plead guilty in order to gain his
freedom and gain access to the funds and transfer them back to Mr. Waters.
The court should never have accepted the Alford plea.
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of
insuring that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent
choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution
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that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted
unless there is a factual basis for the plea, see, e. g., Griffin v. United
States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 110, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380, (1968);
Bruce v. United States, supra, at 342, 379 F.2d at 119 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A.2d 294 (1969); and
until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to
resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of
innocence. See, e. g, People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308-309,
206 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1965); State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 563,
63 S.E. 169, 171 (1908). See also Kreuter v. United States,
201 F.2d33,36(CA10 1952).
To satisfy due process rights and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a trial court must adequately ensure, by way of colloquy
with the defendant, that he understands all rights waived and retained under
Rule 11(e) Bluemel v. State, 134 P.3d. 185 (2006). Moreover, to ensure a
defendant's due process rights, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial
courts must strictly comply with the elements of Rule 11(e) See State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). A court's strict compliance with Rule
11 requires the trial court to establish (1) that "the defendant's guilty plea is
truly knowing and voluntary," and (2) that a the defendant knowingly waived
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his constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." State v.
Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, in applying the Rule
11(e) strict compliance analysis, the factual elements of the charges against a
defendant must be explained so that the defendant understands and admits
each element of each offense. Gibbons at 1313.
The plea affidavit did not contain a recitation of the facts the State
would rely upon or the elements of the offense(s) to which the Defendant
was pleading guilty, nor did the Court review the elements of the offense
during the plea colloquy.

The failure to advise the Defendant of the

elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty was error. It was
also error to fail to advise the Defendant that he had a time-limited right to
withdraw his plea of guilty in violation of Rule 11(e)(7).
Rule 11 (e)(4)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty
and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found
there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise
unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence
to establish a substantial risk of conviction;

In the Federal courts, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 expressly provides
that a court "shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless
it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." North Carolina v.
15

Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct 160 (1970). In the Alford case the state had the
investigating police officer testify under oath as to the evidence the State
would rely on if the case were to go to trial. The State had the officer testify
as to all the elements of the crime to substantiate the guilty plea. In Mr.
Dunn's case the State set forth some facts, but did not allege these facts in
sufficient detail as satisfy all the elements of the alleged offense.(see facts
above).
It would have been wise for the State to have either Mr. Waters
testify or the investigating officer testify as to his investigation of the
actions of Mr. Dunn. This may have created a sufficient record the Mr.
Dunn somehow committed the crimes with which he was charged. Absent
such a record the Court can only speculate whether or not a factual basis
exists for the plea. The State definitely did not set forth the element of
deception as required under the statue. Therefore the appellant asks this
court to set aside his plea.
ISSUE III. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IS CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per
curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, State v.
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Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when
"the judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence
imposed is clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah
1990)(citations and quotations omitted.) Furthermore, an appellate court can
only find an abuse of discretion 4 If It can be said that no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Houk, 906 P.2d at
909 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to
consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive
sentence.
The Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of Theft by Deception
Second Degree Felonies. The decision of the Trial court to run them
consecutive constitutes an abuse of discretion..
In State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court
outlined four mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The
Court reversed the trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences.
The Supreme Court's reasoning was sound and should be applied in this
case to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. In Galli, the Supreme
Court found that the trial courts abused their discretion. "The record shows
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that Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may no have given adequate weight to
certain mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938.
In Galli there were four mitigating factors that the trial courts failed to
consider that caused them to abuse their discretion. All of the four factors
can be applied favorably to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was
that Galli had not inflicted physical injuries on his victims. Id. Galli had used
a gun, but it was a pellet gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury.
Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant pled guilty to property crimes.
The second factor in Galli was that his criminal history did not
support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. In the case at bar, the
Defendant does not have a lengthy criminal record for violence but does
have a history of writing bad checks and fraud.
The third factor was that Galli had voluntarily confessed and admitted
responsibilities for his crimes. "The record suggests that he has expressed a
commitment and hope to improve himself." Id. In the case of the bar, the
Defendant stated in the sentencing hearing that he came up with idea of the
plea bargain so that he could return the money to Mr. Waters. R.107 P 6.
The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were
not in accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed
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that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve
himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. Id.
The trial court did not consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs.
In the sentence given by the trial court there is no mention that the defendant
could benefit from counseling for theft. R. 107.
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by
the Supreme Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors,
and therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to the
Utah State Prison on consecutive counts. For these reasons, the Defendant
respectfully requests this Court to remand this case back to the trial court so
he can be re-sentenced.

CONCLUSION
The defendant would like to transfer the funds back to Mr. Waters but
he is unable to do so while in custody of the Department of Corrections. He
is unable to perform his part of the bargain and requests that court grant him
additional time to do so or allow him to withdraw his plea.
The trial court did not strictly follow Rule 11. There was not a
sufficient factual basis given to support the plea. Furthermore, the elements
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of the crime were not contained in the plea agreement and he was never
informed of his rights to withdraw his plea.
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive
sentences on the defendant. The Court should have looked at the
defendant's rehabilative needs. For these reasons the Defendant respectfully
requests this Court to remand his case back to the trial court to either allow
his plea to be set aside, given more time to perform on the contract or to be
re-sentenced.

A

DATED this J ?

day of February, 2009.

DAVID M PERRY
Attorney for Appellant
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 071100069 FS

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

CLINT S. JUDKINS
February 25, 200*

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindac
Prosecutor: BAIRD, TONY C
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 19, 1968
Video
CHARGES
1. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition 05/11/07
3. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
4. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
5. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
6. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree: Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
7. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
8. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
9. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 05/11/07
10. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition 05/11/07
Paap i

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

Case No: 071100069
Date:
Feb 25, 2008

11. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty
SENTENCE

PRISON

Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more. than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison,
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
Pacrp. ?.

Case No: 071100069
Date:
Feb 25, 2008
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison,
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant.will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Charges 1 through 3 will run consecutive to charges 4 through 7,
and charges 8 through 11 will run consecutive to those charges.

Paae 3

Case No: 0 71100069
Date:
Feb 25, 2 00 8

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0. 00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge #

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 3

Fine :
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due ;

$1500.00
$0.00
$702 . 70
$1500.00

Charge # 4

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0 . 00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 5

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0 .00
$702 .70
$1500.00

Charge # 6

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702 .70
$1500.00

Charge # 7

Fine :
Suspended;
Surcharge
Due :

$1500.00
$0. 00
$702 .10
$1500 00

Charge # 8

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 9

Fine: $1500.00

Darro

A

Case N o : 071100069
Date:
Feb 25, 2008
$0.00
$702 . 70
$1500.00

Suspended
Surcharge
Due
#10

Fine: $1500.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $702.70
Due: $1500.00

Charge # 11

Fine: $1500,00
$0.00
Suspended
$702.70
Surcharge
Due $1500.00

Charge

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:
Restitution

Dated this

$16500
$0
$7729.7
$16500
Plus Interest
Amount: $1149175.00 Plus Interest

Z ^ T d a y of

V~3^>

tfr't; V, \ '•

P --'4

CLINT S, J KINS
District Co1 rt Judge

§ /$
0
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rN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

071100069

LARRY P. DUNN.
Judge: Clint S. Judkins
Defendant.

I, Larry D. Dunn, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and
that I understand the following facts and rights:

Waiver of Preliminary Hearing
I understand that I am waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary
hearing is a procedure to determine probable cause and to inform an accused of the
charges against him or her. Competent evidence which shows probable cause that the
charged crime was committed and that the defendant committed it is sufficient to hold an
accused to answer. The evidence does not have to be sufficient for a conviction at trial.
I understand that at a preliminary hearing, an accused has the right to be
represented by counsel. If an accused cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to
represent him or her.
I understand, that an accused may call and compel witnesses to testify on his or her
behalf, and confront and cross examine any witnesses the State may call to testify. I
understand that an accused may testify on his or her behalf, or remain silent and say
nothing. In order to proceed with my plea today, I waive my preliminary hearing.

ENT'D MAY 1 4 ?nn7

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:

Crime & Statutory Provision
A.

Degree

Theft by Deception (Eleven Counts) 2nd Felony

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
1-15 yrs Prison
$10,000 Fine + 85% surcharge

1 have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes(s) to which I
am pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) will are
as stated in the criminal information filed in this case. See Information on file in this
case.
1 understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my
guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am
pleading guilty ( or no contest): The facts are those stated by the prosecutor in open court
during the plea hearing.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
understand that I might alter, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me.

I have not waived my right to counsel. I am represented by David Perry.
I certify that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty (or
no contest) pier (s).
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the
consequences o r my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).

Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have
the opportunity ^o cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.

Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance
and testimony ( f those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear,
the State would pay those costs.

Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against
myself. I also know that if 1 chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could
not hold my refusal to testify against me.

Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of
the charged crimes(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not
guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a
jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me
guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.

Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).

I know and understand that by pleading guilty or no contest, I am waiving
and giving up all the statutory and constitutional right as explained above.

Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea

Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine,
or both.

I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, includirg any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part
of a plea agreement.

Conseci:tive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one
crime involved the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they
may run at the ^ame time (concurrently). 1 know that I may be charged an additional fine
for each crime hat I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead
guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive
sentences would be inappropriate.

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a
plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and

provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including
those explained below:
A. I agree to plead guilty to the eleven counts of Theft by Deception as charged in
the Information in the present case, each a second degree felony.
B. If not already in the possession of my probation/parole officer, I agree to turn
my passport(s) over to my attorney, David Perry, until this case is concluded. I further
agree not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from my
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case.
C. I agree to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of my
defense attorney, David Perry, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and
being released from the Utah State Prison. This money will be paid to Richard Waters to
compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to me during the years
of 2004 and 2005 (as outlined in the State's discovery). These monies are the subject of
the eleven counts in the present case.
D. The State agrees that upon me entering guilty pleas to the eleven counts
discussed above, it will stipulate to an own recognisance release for a period of 90 days.
M W ^ K , +^£hcb ivillioi'>'te clUttui* iU foubjck JPcjnio^ flee h>$ W
•
E. The State further agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has
received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, it will stipulate to me withdrawing my pleas to
the eleven counts and the present case will be dismissed.
Trial Judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what
they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest).
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any
changes because all of the statements are correct.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

I am JjL Years of age. I have attended school through the

'V

grade. I can

read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my
judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I
am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I

understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilt) (or no contest), I will
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after
sentencing must be pursued under the Fost-Conviction Remedies Act in title 78,
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this

/'

ii

Day of.

(

yLarry D. Dunn
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Certificate of Defense Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for

, the defendant

above, and that i know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understand the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly state; and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit,
are accurate an 1 true.

/JJt)iw)
ATTORNEY FOR^DEFENDANT
David Perry
Bar No.:

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
, defendant. I have reviewed this
Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered
and that the ace ^ptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Tony C. Baird
Bar No.:

Order

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court
witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

It IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

Li

Day of _

\M A^|

., 20_6_^.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

) Case No. 071100069
) Transcript of Videotape.
)

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,
Defendant.

)

Transcript of Entry of Plea.
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Logan, Utah
May 11, 2007

1

*

*

*

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

TONY C. BAIRD
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant:

DAVID M. PERRY
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court

B)^ 7
J

0
1

THE COURT:

Let's take the case of State of Utah

versus Larry Douglas Dunn.
pretrial conference.

This is the time set for a

Mr. Perry, obviously your negotiations

have been successful.

WiLl you verbalize for me your

arrangement, please.
MR. PERRY:
agreement.

Your Honor, we prepared a written plea

In that agreement it sets forth all of the terms.

The court has the copy.

What basically Mr. Dunn is going to

plead guilty to is the 11 counts.

He's going to waive his

right to a preliminary hearing and plead guilty to the 11
counts.

The state will then release him on his own

recognizance.

We'll waive our right to be sentenced within

90 days, or within 45 days.

And we'll set sentencing in 90

days .
During that 90 day time frame Mr. Dunn, if he has a
passport, will turn it over to me or his probation or parole
officer.

He agrees to deposit $1.3 million in my trust

account.

And this money will be paid to the victim Richard

Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005.
And they are the monies subject to the 11 counts in the
present case.
The state agrees that upon entering the guilty pleas to
the 11 counts they will stipulate to his own recognizance for
a period of 90 days.

The state further agrees that once it
2

has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in
legal funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing
his pleas to the 11 counts and the present case will be
dismissed.
They've also agreed that if he has any problems with -he had a parole date last week.
based upon this agreement.

The Board should release him

The state has also agreed to

write a letter to the Board recommending that he be released
for this time period so he can get these monies together.
THE COURT:

So it's anticipated that with this

agreement he will be released from the Utah State Prison?
MR. BAIRD:

Yeah.

We'll ask the court to make sure

that there's an OR release in this case, his own recognizance
release.
THE COURT:

What is he in prison for now?

MR. BAIRD:

A bad check, I think, a bad check

THE COURT:

Out of which court?

MR. BAIRD:

Salt Lake.

MR. PERRY:

Third District.

THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you understand and realize

offense.

that if the court approves this thing here today and I
release you on your own recognizance on this case, I don't
have any control over whatever that other case is down at the
prison?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

Absolutely.

I'm still on parole

until 2027.
THE COURT:

But you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

The state is comfortable that he will be

released and can follow through on this arrangement that has
been made.
Mr. Dunn, you've been incarcerated, but have you consumed
any alcohol or drugs before coming in here today?
THE DEFENDANT:

Not drugs, but I take medications.

And they're nonpsychotropic.
THE COURT:

Those medications that you are taking do

not affect your ability to make a reasoned decision right
now; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

They don't.

Do you feel you've had ample opportunity

to discuss this matter with your attorney, Mr. Perry?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Very much so.

Do you feel that you understand what is

going on here today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Very well, yes.

Has anyone promised you or threatened

you with anything to get you to plead guilty to these 11
counts other than as set forth in this document or
represented to the court by your attorney?
4

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

You understand that any recommendation

made to me as to what sentence you should receive would be a
recommendation only and I may or may not accept the
recommendation, do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

After I've done X, Y and Z you still

would have the authority to not dismiss the case?
THE COURT:

That's correct.

I'm inclined to do

that, but you need to understand that these are all
recommendations, everything that has been said.

I can see no

reason at this point in time -- I understand that this is a
result of much negotiation, et cetera, that has gone on and
the court in all probability would follow through on that.
But you need to understand that I have the last word and if I
get additional information I may do something different.

You

understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

Has the defendant waived his

preliminary hearing?
MR. PERRY:

No, Your Honor.

MR. BAIRD:

No.

THE COURT:

You understand that this statement of

He needs to do that.

defendant sets forth the rights you have as relates to a
preliminary hearing?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

5

THE COURT:

And the purpose of a preliminary hearing

is to ascertain whether or not the state can show that
there's probable cause to believe that the offenses you were
charged with were commi.tted and you were the person who
committed those.

This sets forth those rights.

By signing

this document you give up your right to that preliminary
hearing, you understancI that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
signature.

Yes, sir.

Tb is document does appear to bear your

You signed this before it was submitted to me; is

that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Immediately, right now.

Very well.

J

The counts that I understand

you will be pleading guilty to are all second degree
felonies.

They appear to all be theft by deception.

read count one.

I'll

Theft by deception, a second degree felony,

in violation of Utah Co de Annotated section 76-6-405.

The

information alleges that the defendant did, on or about May
18th, 2004, obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of another by deception with the purpose to deprive
the owner thereof.

The value of the property or services was

or exceeded $5000.

Or the property was stolen from the

J

person of another.
Count two is exactl y the same as the first, except the
date there is July 16th , 2004.

Count three is the same as
6

J

count two, including the date.
five is the same.

As is count four and count

Count six is the same as those previously

described except the date there is July 26th, 2004.
seven is also the same, theft by deception.
is January 20th of 2005.

Count

The date there

Count eight is the same as

previously set forth, except the date is January 21st, 2005.
Count nine is the same, except the date is January -- excuse
me, July 23rd, 2005.

Count ten is theft by deception as

previously described, with the date being August 8th, 2005.
And count 11 is, again, theft by deception, the same as
previously described, except the date is January 6th, 2006.
To those 11 counts, Mr. Dunn, how do you plead?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Can I make a suggestion?

What's the date on the first one?

The date on the first one is May 18th,

2004.
THE DEFENDANT:

You might want to have me plead

guilty -- you said the first one, have me just do the second
ones.

I was incarcerated then.

I was incarcerated at that time.

It's just a matter of dates.
I'm pleading guilty to all

of them, but -MR. BAIRD:

It's on or about.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I still plead guilty.

All right.

To those 11 counts how do
7

1

you plead?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

Guilty.

Mr. Baird, give us the factual basis for

the 11 counts.

5

MR. BAIRD:

On the dates -- on or about the dates

6

alleged in the information, from a source here in Cache

7

County, state of Utah, Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies

8 J from here to accounts under the control of Mr. Dunn.
9

Each

one of these transfers was in excess of $5,000.

10 I

Mr. Waters, if called to testify, would testify that

11 J these monies were transferred for a specific purpose.

And

12 J that these monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn
13

acknowledged that he received these amounts.

14

That subsequently, some several months later, Mr. Waters

15

demanded that the defendant give the monies back and the

16

defendant has not returned those funds.

17

present evidence that these funds were used inconsistently --

18

inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn

19

for.

20 I funds.
21
22

The state would

Thus Mr. Dunn exercised unauthorized control over the
Along with the other elements, those are the facts

that we would prove.
THE COURT:

When you indicate to us, Mr. Baird, that

23

the money was used for other purposes than what was

24

originally designated by Mr. Waters, apparently that was for

25

the purpose of depriving Mr. Waters of the benefit of that

money; is that correct?
MR. BAIRD:

Is that what you're maintaining?

When the money was used inconsistent for

the purpose for which Mr. Waters gave it to Mr. Dunn, and
then subsequently not returning the money, refusing to return
it, it shows an intent to permanently deprive -- there were
several demands made.

Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of

these facts, but this is the evidence we would present, that
the money was given to him for, among other things, a
business venture and some other things.

But in any event the

monies -- the state would present evidence, bank records, to
show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose
for which it was given to him.
THE COURT:

And that Mr. Waters was deprived of the

MR. BAIRD:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you've heard the facts as

money?
He's never received the money

back.

related to us by Mr. Baird.

Are you pleading guilty because

you committed the offenses as he described them?
MR. PERRY:

I don't think he would agree to that.

Maybe we might have to do it on an Alford basis.
pleading guilty to get out of jail.

He's

The reason he couldn't

get the money back once the demand was made was his probation
officer -- his probation got violated down in Salt Lake
County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to access

9

1 1 the money.
MR. BAIRD:

2

We would agree to an Alford type plea.

3 1 I understand Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of the
4

representations that the state has made . Nonetheless, that's

5 J the evidence we would present.
6
7

We would present bank records

and whatnot to show that the money was used inconsistently.
I think Mr. Dunn realizes that there' s some give and take

8

here.

He understands that this is in his best interest to do

9

this, to make this arrangement.

Sc> I think for purposes of

10

resolving it and looking at the lik.elihoc d of conviction and

11

weighing all those sorts of things, I think that he believes

12 1 that this is in his best interest.

At least I think so from

Is that right, Mr. Du nn, you believe this

13

our conversations.

14

is in your best interest?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

Yes.

Mr. Dunn, the court can't accept a

17

guilty plea to something unless somebody committed the

18

offense and you're telling me you d idn' t commit the offense.

19

But there's an exception to that an d that exception is what

20

we call an Alford type plea.

21

consultation with your attorney, you have determined that it

22

is in your best interest to accept the pi ea bargain that the

23

state has proposed because you thin k if y ou went to trial

24

your chances of being convicted are such that you're better

25

off to take this plea.

That is where, after

1
I

J

Is that wha t you 're telling me here

-

10

in this case?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

The court will accept the

plea, designating it as an Alford type plea.

But I need to

assure you that in doing that, if you don't follow through on
this arrangement and it becomes necessary for this court to
pass sentence, you are sentenced the same as if you admitted
you performed the acts.

The court will accept it as a guilty

plea, you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

The court will accept and

designate it as an Alford type plea.

I will sign the order

containing the statement of defendant and incorporate that
into the record.

Pursuant to your agreement, the court will

authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance
pursuant to the terms and conditions in the statement of
defendant.
Counsel, how are we going to review this?

How do you

want to handle that?
MR. PERRY:

Set it for a sentencing date in 90 days,

THE COURT:

Set it for sentencing, is that what you

I guess.

want to do?

I guess there's no need for a PSI in this case.

Who is going to report back to the court if he's performed
all of the obligations?
11

MR. BAIRD:

We will.

I guess, frankly, what we

probably ought to do, because otherwise he'll have to be
referred to AP&P for a statement and that sort of thing.

I

would suggest that we set it for a status hearing 90 days
out, 90 days from this coming Monday.

And then at that time

we'll know whether everything has been fulfilled.

If not, I

guess set it for sentencing.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Can I ask a question?

Ask your attorney and he can bring it to

my attention.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
MR. PERRY:

His question was if he has the money

sooner than 90 days can we come back before the court and
have this dismissed.

My answer was I'm sure the state

wouldn't oppose a dismissal if the money is returned.
THE COURT:
every Monday.

Mr. Dunn, we handle routine matters

If you get this thing taken care of before

that, notify your attorney.

Mr. Perry knows how to put it on

the next Monday's calendar.
All right.
ten.

We'll schedule it for the 20th of August at

The court will designate that as a status conference.

I'll expect the parties to come prepared at that time to
represent to me whether or not -- in as much as we don't have
AP&P or someone monitoring it, the attorneys will have to be
prepared to come and tell me what the status of the case is
12

that day.
All right.

Have we covered all of the bases?

MR. PERRY:

I did say this earlier on the record,

but, Mr. Dunn, are you willing to waive your right to be
sentenced within 45 days?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I appreciate that Mr. Perry.

Anything

else that we should take care of?
MR. PERRY:

Nothing that I have.

THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, have we covered everything in

this matter?
MR. BAIRD:

I believe so, yes.

THE COURT:

Very well.

THE BAILIFF:

Court is in recess.

(Hearing concluded.)
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THE COURT:
Dunn.

Let's take State versus Larry Douglas

Mr. Perry, I show that this is the time set for

sentencing on

11 counts, all theft by deception, all second

degree felonies.

Any reason why sentence should not be

passed at this time?
MR. PERRY:

Your Honor, I think this is a case that

we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to see if he's
competent to proceed.

I'll file the petition and ask the

court to stay sentencing until the state can look at him and
see if he understood what he was doing when he entered his
plea or not.
THE DEFENDANT:
vigorously defend me?

Can I ask for an attorney that would
I deserve that whether I'm guilty or

not.
THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, input from the state on Mr.

Perry's motion?
MR. BAIRD:

May we approach?

THE COURT:

Come forward.

(Sidebar, not recorded.)
THE COURT:

The court has had an opportunity to

visit with counsel at the bench.

Mr. Perry, anything

further?
MR. PERRY:
presentence report.

Mr. Dunn needs a few minutes to read the
I haven't talked to him since he was

here last.
2

THE COURT:
with him.

You've had ample opportunity to visit

It's time to proceed.
MR. PERRY:

I make a motion to withdraw his guilty

pleas that he entered.
THE COURT:
writing.

The motion will need to be made in

You can do that at a later time.
MR. PERRY:

We object to proceeding with sentencing

at this time because in order for him to -- once he's
sentenced he's not able to withdraw his plea.

So we'd like

to make a motion prior to sentencing to see if the plea can
be withdrawn.

I want to supplement that by having him

examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he
was competent at the time he entered his plea.
THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, the court has heard your

comments at the bench, but I'll hear what you have to say on
the record.
MR. BAIRD:

We oppose that.

with sentencing today.

We'd like to go ahead

If counsel wants to file a motion at

a later time, we'll respond to it then.
THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Perry?

MR. PERRY:

We object to proceeding with sentencing

today because we've made -- we want to make a petition to
determine whether he's competent to proceed.

Once we make

that petition, Your Honor, as you well know that stays all
proceedings.

So we can't proceed with anything further until
3

that issue is resolved, unless you want to have a hearing to
see whether the petition is valid.

That still stays all

proceedings.
I make that petition at this time in behalf of Mr. Dunn
to stay all proceedings so that we can determine whether he
was competent at the time he entered his plea and whether his
plea should be withdrawn or not.
THE COURT:

Mr. Perry, this matter has been pending

for I'm not sure how long.
are untimely.

The court finds that your motions

I'll allow you to file those in writing if you

so desire, but the court will proceed with sentencing today.
Anything else you'd like to place on the record?
MR. PERRY:

Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where

he was hopeful that he could get out of prison and get over
to the Isle Mann where he's indicated he has the one point
three million dollars to pay Mr. Waters.

He was unable to

get out of prison and get access to these funds in order to
pay the restitution to Mr. Waters.
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get
access to this money, he has not had the benefit of the
bargain that was entered into in this case.

That being that

once he paid the 1.3 million the state would stipulate to him
being able to withdraw his plea and the charges be dismissed.
Because of his inability to have access to this money that's
in the Isle Mann, an off shore trust, because of his
4

incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution.
Had he been able to make restitution we wouldn't be
proceeding with sentencing today and the charges would be
dismissed.
Mr. Dunn is confident that he has that money there.
believes the money is there.

He

He just needs to be able to

access the money and then Mr. Waters can be made whole.
sentencing him to prison it will delay that.
will -- he may be in prison a long time.

By

And plus it

He pled straight up

to the charges with the understanding that he thought he
would be able to get out of prison and get the money.

The

state wrote a letter and tried to help him in that matter.
Because of different factors he's been unable to -- he
was released to a halfway house, but they would not allow him
telephone access or any type of pass to be able to access
this money.

Therefore he's still in prison.

I believe he

has a Board date, or maybe not.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. PERRY:

I went to the Board.

You went to the Board and don't have a

date?
THE DEFENDANT:

The Board said I needed to figure

out this second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you
about yet.

Then go back and tell them what happened.

They're pending right now posing you a question, but I
haven't even spoken to my attorney.
5

THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. PERRY:

Anything you want to say to the Judge 9

This is the time for sentencing, Mr. Dunn.
THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, input from the state?

MR. BAIRD:

I think the report done by the AP&P

agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent.

I thought he did a

great job of explaining what Mr. Dunn is all about.

Mr. Dunn

is a complete fraud and he continues to try to -- even today
it's continually a fraud.

He's unlike many defendants, or

any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted.

I think Mr.

Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate.
court to sentence the defendant to prison.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I ask the

I'll submit it.

Can I say something, Your Honor?

Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT:

I came up with this idea.

I asked

originally for a pow wow to all get together so the
prosecution could see that Richard was all on board and
understanding.

The prosecution saw that.

to Richard, what he said.

Mr. Baird listened

Everything that I've said is

exactly one line linear after the next.
I said that this deal had to be done before May 8th.
prison did not transport me on -- was it the 5th?

The

The Friday

beforehand I had court here and for no reason at all the
prison didn't transport me.
this lady here sent it m ,

Your assistant sent it in, maybe
but I wasn't transported.

6

The deal needed to be done before May 8th is what the
Board said and then I would be released on May 8th last year.
It wasn't done before May 8th.

I came actually on Friday, a

week after -- four days after I was to be released.
lost that May 8th Board date.

So now I

I even said to you on that

date, and it's on the video or the transcript, I said I could
be another three to six months before I get released.
I come back and meet with you and I was still cheery.

I

said to you I've seen the Board, they told me I'd be released
July 31st, but it's now August 20th.

Clearly something is

arrears.
I went back and my captain, Hughes, who doesn't like
inmates, threatened me saying if I'm not telling the truth
I'd go to max.

He took me at my word and called the Board.

The Board lost my file.

They said that they misplaced it.

They misplaced it during the summer time, whatever happened.
They said we'll get right on it.

It wasn't done.

I finally

wrote to Deputy Warden Bouseo and asked for his help.
contacted Officer Valdez, our caseworker.

And I

They called the

Board and a Ms. Cheryl, and I don't know if that's Ms. Cheryl
Hansen or not, but a Ms. Cheryl said, oh, my gosh, and I
heard, it was on the speaker phone, this deal isn't done yet.
If I can find a Board member it will be done by this
afternoon.

And the next day I had my Board date for the

13th.
7

Now, the next mess up -- I haven 1 t done anything wrong

1

Everybody keeps saying I'm such a bad person, but I

2

yet.

3

never get to perform.

4

have another angiogram.

5

Mr. Baird, but I got emails in my poc <et that these gentlemen

6

brought up, that my dad sent around saying junior needs to be

7

watched, make sure he's taking his bl Dod, everything for the

8

angiogram.

9

My dad gets involved because I had to
I don't know if he got involved with

I got sent to a halfway house which I never asked to go.

10

The Board actually, when I went to th<em, they didn't know I'd

11

went to the halfway house.

12

there.

13

like still being in prison, but you can get your own food and

14

stuff like that.

15
16
17
18

They said why did you ask to go

I didn't ask to go there.

THE COURT:

At a halfway house it's

Mr. Dunn, I have other matters that need

to be taken care of.
THE DEFENDANT:

But you need to knowing everything

was mixed up.

19

THE COURT:

Make your comments relevant to --

20

THE DEFENDANT:

These are re levant.

These are

21

exactnesses.

Now I get to the halfwa;/ house and they say I

22

can't come to court unless I receive <a. fax from you in the

23

morning time.

24

faxed something down.

25

now have a $20,000 bail.

I called every morning that morning and they
My boss brings me up and I see you.
I come back

I don't run away.

I

They had seven men run away from the halfway house.
I'm trying to resolve this.

If I go to prison right now

Mr. Waters won't get his money.

I've been in prison right

now not because I've done another crime or something, but
because of this.
His attorney, Mr. Brown, this is very important, these
are exacts, went to my agent.

They called the judge and said

I'm a bad person, let's send him to prison on this stuff
right here.

So I've served two years on something I should

never have done in the beginning.

Richard and I should have

sat down and got it worked out instead of him going to my
parole agent.

Now I'm here facing 11 felony twos.

I gave

you the opportunity to hang me if I didn't perform, but

I've

never performed.
Moreover, the court attorney, I haven't even seen this -what is this called? -- the PSI.
yet.

I haven't even seen the PSI

But PSI agent at the hearing -- the attorney at the

hearing, Manny Garcia, said this isn't even acceptable to the
court because Mr. Feltenberger lied to the Board and
misrepresented stuff that we've already defended before the
Board and that they threw out.

So this actually isn't even

admissible in your court upon some law that they said.
THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you have another 30 seconds.

Finish it up.
THE DEFENDANT:

So you want to resolve this and I
9

want to resolve this.

I thought m

the beginning when I met

you you signed on this as being a good deal.
saying I'm such a bad guy.

Everybody keeps

When do I get to perform?

I've

been incarcerated now for two years on something I didn't do,
this right here.

An Alford plea where I say I'm not guilty,

but the other guy says I am, so we figure out a way to
resolve it.

If you want to resolve it -- I don't need

anybody to determine if I'm crazy.
plan here.

I invented this little

So why are you sentencing me -- to take it out of

the Board's hands and sentencing me to probation for the same
90 days when I'm released from prison?
THE COURT:
up.

Very well.

Mr. Dunn, your 30 seconds is

Anything further, Mr. Perry?
MR. PERRY:

I just wonder if the court would

continue this for like an hour setting to hear all of the
facts?
THE COURT:

No, counsel.

on and talking about fairy tales.

This thing has gone on and
All of his life he f s been

able to dupe people into things like this.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Name one thing where I've messed up.

That's enough, Mr. Dunn.

isn't going to be provoked any further.
motions to file, file them.
the past and you didn't.

This court

Counsel, if you have

You could have filed those in

Mr. Dunn has all of these big

stories that he'd like everybody to believe.

He's done that
10

all his life.

This court won't be manipulated further.

Waters isn't going to get his money.
dangle that as a carrot.

Mr.

He keeps trying to

If he had any money that he wanted

to give Mr. Waters he could have done that in the past.

We

tried that and it didn't work.
Anything

further?

MR. PERRY:

Ask the court to at least run them

concurrent.
THE COURT:

It will be ordered that the defendant on

the 11 counts serve not less than one nor more than 15 years
in the Utah State Penitentiary.
fine in the amount of $1500.

On each count he's to pay a

Pay restitution in the amount

of $1,149,175, plus interest.
The court will run counts one through three
consecutively.

Counts four through seven consecutively and

counts eight through 11 consecutively.

Very well.

That will

be the order of the court.
(Hearing concluded.)
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